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Of Word Grenades and Impermeable
Walls: Imperial Scholarship Then and
Now
Juan F. Pereat
I. Finding Light
Richard Delgado has been a profound influence for many of
us. Having taught law for some years now, I am proud to know
Richard well as a friend, colleague, co-author and kindred spirit.
But the first time I remember him inspiring me dates back to
before I became a law professor. I would like to share that story
here.
I recall as a law student attending a lecture on the First
Amendment by a famous Harvard Law School professor. While he
gave his lecture, I thought about the problem of hate speech and
the injuries it causes. It seemed to me that the purpose of hate
speech was and is to cause injury. If that is so, then I wondered
why it could not be regulated in the same way we regulate other
injurious acts, like throwing a stone that injures someone. I was
puzzled about why we don't regulate hate speech, so after the
lecture I approached the professor and asked him my question:
"Why, if the intent underlying hate speech is merely to injure
someone, can't it be regulated in the same way that we might
regulate an incident of stone-throwing that causes injury?" The
professor looked at me with something like contempt and
answered, with consummate arrogance, "What is the political
content in throwing a stone?" He then walked away abruptly,
dismissively, leaving me slightly dazed and wondering why I had
asked such a stupid question.
It took me a long time to
understand that it was not a stupid question.
Fast forward a few years and I am now an associate at Ropes
& Gray in Boston. I decide to take a brief lunch break. I'd like to
see if I can find something interesting in the firm's law library. I
spot the bound volumes containing the Harvard Civil Rights-Civil
Liberties Law Review, which I had never heard of until that

T. Professor of Law, Loyola University Chicago School of Law. I'd like to
thank Bethany Hurd and Evan Gelles for excellent work in organizing this
symposium and for excellent editorial assistance.
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moment. I begin leafing through one of the volumes, and I find
Richard's article Words that Wound.1 I am astonished. Here, at
last, is the answer to the question I had asked years before. Here
is a fully-wrought, clear case for regulating hate speech, just as I
thought should be possible.
Here are words of hope and
encouragement that help me understand that my question had
never been stupid. I learned so much from that article. Lying
beside the often mundane books in the library, there were other
books, containing words of hope, liberation, and justice. There
were voices like Richard's, engaging issues that I recognized, in
some way, and cared about. It was possible to make a life writing
about race and justice and to try to make the world a little bit
better. The small flame within me that wanted that life now
burned more brightly. For that inspiration, and others to come, I
am grateful to Richard.
II. On Authors, Ideology, and Epistemology
The content and sources of knowledge are contested terrain
across all levels of education. Ideology and politics are major
influences in decisions about what shall be taught and who shall
teach it. Battles over the proper content of any curriculum raise
interesting questions of epistemology.2
Recent news stories show the continuing, recurrent political
battles over knowledge and legitimacy in public education. In
Colorado, the Jefferson County School Board, overseeing a district
which includes Denver, wants to restrict history education to
subject matter that .'promote[s] citizenship, patriotism, essentials
and benefits of the free-market system, respect for authority and
respect for individual rights."'3 Under these restrictions, students
would only be taught lessons depicting the United States' heritage
in a positive light.4 Even the Republican National Committee
weighed in on the Jefferson County controversy, calling the

1. Richard Delgado, Words That Wound: A Tort Action for Racial Insults,
Epithets, and Name-Calling, 17 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 133 (1982).
2. Epistemology is the study of "the nature and grounds of knowledge
especially with reference to its limits and validity." Epistemology, MERRIAMWEBSTER ENGLISH DICTIONARY,

http://www.meriam-webster.com/dictionary/epist

emology (last visited Mar. 18, 2015).
3. Colleen Slevin & P. Soloman Banda, Denver Area Students Walk out of
School in Protest,HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 23, 2014, 10:02 PM), http://www.huffing
tonpost.com/2014109/23/denver-students-walk-out n 5871224.html.
4. Id.
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Advanced Placement
United States History standards 'radically
5
revisionist.'
The controversy in Colorado seems to be part of a nationwide
trend. In 2010, for example, Arizona sought to eliminate Mexican
American studies programs in public high schools by banning
educational programs that are "designed primarily for pupils of a
particular ethnic group," that "advocate ethnic solidarity instead
of the treatment of pupils as individuals," that promote "overthrow
of the U.S. government," or that promote "resentment towards a
race or class of people."6
Implementing this law, Tucson
authorities went so far as to ban a list of disfavored books,
including Richard Delgado and Jean Stefancic's Critical Race
Theory reader.7 Having successfully eliminated traces of Mexican
Americans from the curriculum, and lest there be any identifiable
Mexican American presence on the rostrum, the Arizona
Department of Education also proposed banning instructors whose
English was "heavily accented or ungrammatical."8
Other states would also prefer that their young students not
learn about certain matters. In South Carolina, conservatives
asked the College Board to exclude material with ideological bias.
As their primary example of ideological bias, they suggested
excluding lessons about evolution. 0 Of course, the attempt to
exclude evidence-based, scientifically well-accepted knowledge
such as evolution is a stance entirely free of ideology. The disdain
for science also exists in Texas, where some schools are attempting
to adopt textbooks that distort climate science."
5. Nicky Woolf, US 'Little Rebels' Protest Against Changes to History
Curriculum, GUARDIAN (Sept. 26, 2014, 8:49 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/wor
ld/214/sep/26/-sp-colorado-ap-history-curriculum-protest-patriotism-schools stud
ents.
6. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §15-112 (West 2015); see also H.B. 2281, 49th Leg.,
2nd Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2010).
7. Roque Planas, 7 Mexican American Studies Books Banned from Tucson,
Arizona Classrooms (SLIDESHOW), HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 24, 2012, 12:01 PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/10/05/books-banned-arizona n 1941253.html;
see also Richard Delgado, Precious Knowledge: State Bans on Ethnic Studies, Book
Traffickers, (Librotraficantes),and a New Type of Race Trial, 91 N.C. L. REV. 1513
(2013).
8. Miriam Jordan, Arizona Grades Teachers on Fluency, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 30,
2010, 12:01 AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748703572504575213
883276427528.
9. Judd Legum, Oklahoma Lawmakers Vote Overwhelmingly to Ban Advanced
Placement U.S. History, THINK PROGRESS (Feb. 18, 2015, 9:02 AM), http:/thinkpro
gress.org/education/2015/02/17/3623683/oklahoma-lawmakers-vote-overwhlemingban-advanced-placement-history-class/.
10. Id.
11. Mariah Blake, Texas' New Public School Textbooks Promote Climate
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Controversies over what shall be taught and who shall teach
it are not limited to high schools. Commanding far less media
attention, but hitting closer to home, are serious questions about
what shall be taught, and who shall write, about race and racial
history in law schools. In 1984, Richard wrote an important,
controversial article titled The Imperial Scholar: Reflections on a
12
Review of Civil Rights Literature.
In subsequent articles in the
series, Richard updated and expanded on this first article.13 In
this Essay, I want to develop some themes from his Imperial
Scholar articles and to show some of the continuing epistemic
limitations of imperial scholarship. These articles should be read
by anyone interested in knowledge production within the legal
academy. Not only are they remarkably insightful, they are also
models of excellent scholarly writing within our tradition. The
articles are short, but not too short, direct, substantively
important, and written in crisp, lively and vivid prose. We would
all do well to follow his example.
In the initial Imperial Scholar article, Richard examined the
citation practices of an elite group of civil rights scholars. 4 In
studying those citation practices, Richard discovered a scholarly
tradition consisting of "[W]hite scholars' systematic occupation of,
and exclusion of minority scholars from, the central areas of civil
rights scholarship. The mainstream writers tend to acknowledge
only each other's work."5 Analogizing to the reasons underlying
doctrines of standing to bring a case, Richard identified a series of
problems stemming from the work of imperial scholars, White
male writers writing about the rights of persons of color. These
problems include lack of real knowledge and experience regarding
their subject and commitments that differ significantly from the
interests of the people whose rights they are writing about. 7

Change Denial and Downplay Segregation, MOTHER JONES (Sept. 17, 2014, 10:48
AM), http://www.motherjones.com/politics/201409/texas-textbooks-promote-climate
-change-denial-downplay-segregation.
12. See Richard Delgado, The Imperial Scholar: Reflections on a Review of Civil
Rights Literature, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 561 (1984) [hereinafter Imperial Scholar]. On
the impact of Delgado's Imperial Scholar, see Robert S. Chang, Richard Delgado
and the Politics of Citation, 11 BERKELEY J. AFR.-AM. L. & POL'Y 28 (2009).
13. See Richard Delgado, The Imperial Scholar Revisited: How to Marginalize
Outsider Writing, Ten Years Later, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1349 (1992) [hereinafter
Imperial Scholar Revisited].
14. Imperial Scholar, supra note 12 (commenting on the work of scholars
including Paul Brest, Laurence Tribe, Owen Fiss, and Frank Michelman).
15. Id. at 566.
16. Id. at 567-73.
17. Id. at 567-68.
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Finally, imperial scholars "were unaware of basic facts about the
situation in which minority persons live or ways in which they see
the world."18 Richard concluded that "this exclusion of minority
scholars' writings about key issues of race law [has] caused the
literature dealing with race, racism, and American law to be
blunted, skewed, and riddled with omissions."1 The article was
characterized by Derrick Bell as "an intellectual hand grenade,
the wall of the establishment as a form of academic
tossed over
2
protest., 1
Richard's follow-up article, The Imperial Scholar Revisited:
How to Marginalize Outsider Writing, Ten Years Later, identified
a series of coping strategies employed by former and new imperial
scholars. His pithy names for various categories of imperial
scholars describe their strategies well: "Abandonment of the
Field;" "The Unconverted;" and "The Latter-Day Imperialists,"
among others.
Richard found that "mainstream figures who
control the terms of discourse marginalize outsider writing as long
as possible. 2, 3 Richard's seemingly wistful conclusion was that:
Almost a decade later many of the actors have changed, but
the situation is not greatly different. With a few notable
exceptions both the original group and the newcomers rely on
a panoply of devices, ranging from the dismissive Afterthought
to the wishful Translation, to muffle and tame the new
voices. 24
Thirty years after he wrote his first Imperial Scholar article, the
situation is pretty much unchanged since Richard wrote the
Imperial Scholar Revisited.5 There are certainly more scholars of
color in academia today, publishing and adding to our wealth of
knowledge.
Yet, in the main, writings on race remain
marginalized. The knowledge we have produced has neither been
integrated into the canon, nor has it had its proper influence in
the realms of today's imperial scholars.

18. Id.
19. Imperial Scholar Revisited, supra note 13, at 1349 n.5 (describing the
conclusion he reached in the first Imperial Scholar article).
20. Jon Wiener, Law Profs Fight the Power, NATION, Sept. 1989, at 246 (quoting
Derrick Bell).
21. Imperial Scholar Revisited, supra note 13.
22. Id. at 1353-62.
23. Id. at 1351.
24. Id. at 1372.
25. See Chang, supra note 12, at 33; see also Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic,
Living History Interview, 19 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 221, 229-30 (2010)
("That same old boy citation network still operates .... These patterns have been
slow to change.").
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Powerful racial critiques have recently been made in other
disciplines.
For example, Eduardo Bonilla-Silva and Tukufu
Zuberi, in White Logic, White Methods," make a powerful critique
of the methodology of sociology, which they argue confirms White
misbeliefs about race. The flawed methodology results from White
control over knowledge production: "[tihe production of knowledge
about race (and gender and class) is controlled by a small, mostly
male, mostly White elite who perpetuate their power by
designating, among other things, good and bad scholarship."27
Philosophy Professor Charles Mills has also written powerfully of
the necessity for, and relative absence of, a racial critique of
philosophy. 8 Political philosopher Charles Lebron has noted and
addressed the disengagement of philosophy from the realities of
racial injustice."
It seems that many, perhaps most, other disciplines have
their imperial scholars. Richard was well ahead of his time in
making his critique of civil rights scholarship. Yet his critique
remains timely and on point.
III. Imperial Scholarship and the Failure to Recognize the
Proslavery Constitution
A. Feel-Good History and the Feel-Good Constitution
The battles over AP history and other curricular matters that
I began with are battles over ideological control over the content
and dissemination of knowledge. Public officials in Colorado want
to promote "citizenship, patriotism," "respect for authority," and to
depict American heritage in a positive light, among other goals. 0
In Arizona, the legislature banned programs "designed primarily
for pupils of a particular ethnic group," or that promote
"resentment toward a race or class of people," among other
concerns." In both instances, the goal seems to be to present an
idealized and sanitized version of American history in which the
American nation arose out of the grand vision of the founding
fathers with little or no violent conflict, little or no oppression of

26. See EDUARDO BONILLA-SILVA & TUKUFU ZUBERI, WHITE LOGIC, WHITE
METHODS 52 (2008).
27. Id. at 52.
28. See Charles W. Mills, White Ignorance, in RACE AND EPISTEMOLOGIES OF
IGNORANCE 11 (Shannon Sullivan & Nancy Tuana eds., 2007).
29. See CHRIS LEBRON, THE COLOUR OF OUR SHAME (2013).
30. Woolf, supra note 5.
31. H.B. 2281, 49th Leg., 2nd Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2010).
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Black and Brown people, and no thefts of land and resources from
native peoples, Blacks, and Mexican Americans. This is a world
view meant to comfort White Americans and to attempt to assert
the basic soundness of the American nation and its origins.
Ironically, such a curriculum violates Arizona's injunction banning
programs "designed primarily for pupils of a particular ethnic
group. 32 This is a program designed by Whites for the benefit and
comfort of Whites.
The sanitized, feel-good version of American history is
accepted by many as an ideologically neutral presentation of the
facts. However, ideology drives the decisions about which stories
to tell and which to ignore; which evidence to cite and which to
withhold. There is no ideologically neutral position. 3 History
books and curricula that present Whites as unfailingly positive
and well-meaning, depicting "American heritage in a positive
light," seek to cultivate that positive light. 4 To do so they must
ignore mountains of contrary evidence. High school history texts
have been soundly criticized for presenting such a distorted and
unrealistic view of American history. 5
Historical materials
featuring Blacks, Indians, and Latinos, though frequently
characterized disparagingly as "revisionist" and "ethnic" or
"racial," provide balance and perspective to the sanitized, allegedly
patriotic curriculum.
There is nothing unpatriotic about
presenting historical evidence of injustice. This evidence simply
permits a different interpretation of American history and
nationality based on more complete historical evidence.
With these points in mind, it is interesting to turn our
attention to our own discipline. The same forceful critiques of
high school history texts for leaving out conflict, violence, and
racism, can be made of constitutional law casebooks. The authors
of these casebooks are overwhelmingly White and male.37 In
constitutional law, imperial scholars, mostly White and male,

32. Id.
33. KEITH JENKINS, RETHINKING HISTORY 69-70 (1991).

34. Legum, supra note 9.
35. FRANCES FITZGERALD, AMERICA REVISED (1979); JAMES W. LOEWEN, LIES
MY TEACHER TOLD ME (1995).

36. Woolf, supra note 5.
37. See Bryan K. Fair, A Constitutional Law Casebook for the 21st Century: A
Critical Essay on Cohen and Varat, 21 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 859, 881-83 (1998)
(noting a "longstanding criticism of casebook and law review authors is that too
often they cite the work of a narrow group, namely [W]hite men citing other
[W]hite men").
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largely control the content of knowledge of the entire field. 8 And
while different books are more-or-less mildly conservative or
liberal in leaning, by and large the fundamental canon and
doctrines of constitutional law remain what they have been for
many years.
The insights of minority scholars writing on race have not
made the difference that they should have in the ethereal worlds
of imperial constitutional law scholarship. For example, the farreaching implications of Derrick Bell's interest convergence theory
could promote better understanding of the complex reasons why
Brown v.Board of Education was decided as it was and when it
was, and why the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was enacted." Bell's
interest convergence theory states essentially that civil rights
gains for Blacks occur only when such gains are in the interests of
majority Whites.4"
Bell postulated, and Mary Dudziak
demonstrated, that the Cold War, in addition to other factors,
exerted important influence on United States policymakers to
enact internationally visible civil rights reforms.41 These views
provide an important corrective to the traditional liberal notion
that, by the time of Brown and after, White institutions had
finally decided to do the just thing of their own accord. Bell's and
Dudziak's work encourages us to be less sanguine about the will of
a majority of Americans for real racial equality. Even important
achievements in the direction of equality can be understood as
self-interested gestures by Whites to shape the appearance of a
will for equality.
B. Recognizing the Proslavery Constitution
As another example, I will discuss the reluctance of
contemporary constitutional law scholars to name and discuss the
proslavery Constitution. I call the document proslavery because
the Constitution's text created incentives for slave ownership and
importation, and protected the slave trade and the ability of slave
masters to recapture escaped slaves.42 In addition, James Madison
38. See id.; see also Imperial Scholar, supra note 12, at 563 (describing the
tendency of White male legal scholars to cite other "inner-circle" White males).
39. Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Brown v. Board of Education and the InterestConvergence Dilemma, 93 HARV. L. REV. 518, 524-25 (1980); Richard Delgado,
White Interests and Civil Rights Realism: Rodrigo's Bittersweet Epiphany, 101
MICH. L. REV. 1201, 1208-09 (2003).
40. Bell, supra note 39, at 523.
41. MARY L. DUDZIAK, COLD WAR CIVIL RIGHTS: RACE AND THE IMAGE OF

AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 14-15 (2000).
42. See infra pp. 450-54; see also Juan F. Perea, Race and ConstitutionalLaw
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and others argued that the Constitution's protections for slavery43
warranted its ratification by the slaveholding Southern states.
Proslavery is a fair name for a document that creates incentives
and protections for increased slave ownership. Two years ago, I
published a critique of four leading constitutional law casebooks
for their failure to provide evidence of the proslavery
Constitution.4 In addition, these leading books fail entirely to
consider the contemporary ramifications of a proslavery
Constitution.
A majority of contemporary historians who study the issue
conclude that the Constitution was proslavery.
This evidencebased conclusion by experts in the field should, standing alone, be
sufficient reason for constitutional law casebooks to give central
attention to this understanding and to explore its ramifications.
Instead, we get little or nothing.
A simple review of a few constitutional provisions will
demonstrate how the Constitution is proslavery.
First, the
Apportionment Clause states that representation in the House of
Representatives will be based on the "whole number of free
persons" plus "three fifths of all other persons. 4,
"All other
persons" is the first of many euphemisms for slaves.4 7 This
provision increases the number of representatives of slave states
in the House by adding three fifths of the number of slaves to the
census on which representation is based. 48 The provision provides
additional political power to slave states to protect their slave
property and other interests, therefore providing an incentive to
increase the number of slaves held in slave states in order to boost
representation.49
Casebooks: Recognizing the Proslavery Constitution, 110 MICH. L. REV. 1123, 112630 (2012) (reviewing GEORGE WILLIAM VAN CLEVE, A SLAVEHOLDERS' UNION:
SLAVERY, POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION IN THE EARLY AMERICAN REPUBLIC
(2010)).
43. James Madison, Speech at the Virginia Ratifying Convention (June 17,
1788), reprinted in 3 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE
ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 453, 453-54 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed.
1836); see also James Oakes, "The Compromising Expedient": Justifying a
Proslavery Constitution, 17 CARDOZO L. REV. 2023, 2050 (1996).
44. Perea, supra note 42.
45. See PAUL FINKELMAN, SLAVERY AND THE FOUNDERS (2d ed. 2001); GEORGE
WILLIAM VAN CLEVE, A SLAVEHOLDERS' UNION: SLAVERY, POLITICS AND THE
CONSTITUTION IN THE EARLY AMERICAN REPUBLIC 270 (2010); Oakes, supra note

43, at 2023.
46. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2.
47. FINKELMAN, supra note 45, at 3.
48. Id. at 8, 16.
49. Oakes, supra note 43, at 2040-41.
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Coupled with the Apportionment Clause, the slave-import
limitation guaranteed that Congress could not pass legislation
restricting the slave trade until 1808." ° The Constitution states
that "[tihe migration or importation of such Persons as any of the
States now existing shall think proper to admit, shall not be
prohibited by the Congress prior to the year [18081.1 "Such
persons" is another euphemism for slaves. 2 So the Apportionment
Clause provided more political power for the slave states based on
the size of the slave population, and the slave-import limitation
guaranteed that the slave states would be able to import as many
slaves as they wanted without federal limitation.
As an added measure of protection for slave importation,
Article V adds that "no Amendment which may be made prior to
the Year [1808] shall in any Manner affect the first... Clause[] in
the Ninth Section of the first Article.""3 Article I, Section 9, Clause
1 of the Constitution is the slave import-limitation. 4 This is one of
very few limitations on the amendment power. So not only is
Congress prohibited from ending the slave trade until 1808, but
the nation is forbidden to amend that provision of the Constitution
that protects the slave trade. These are important protections for
the slave trade from federal interference.
Finally, the Constitution contains the Fugitive Slave Clause,
which provides that "No person held to Service or Labour in one
State... escaping into another, shall.., be discharged from such
Service or Labour, but shall be delivered up on claim of the party
to whom such service or labour may be due."5 A "person held to
Service or Labour in one State" is yet another euphemism for
slaves, and possibly indentured servants. This provision created
a new, national right of recapture for slave owners, an additional
protection for their ownership of slave property. The provision
figured positively in ratification debates over the Constitution in
the slave states. There are more protections for slavery in the
Constitution, but these few suffice to make the point. 7

50. U.S. CONST. art. I,
51. Id.

§ 9,

cl. 1.

52. FINKELMAN, supra note 45, at 3.

53. U.S. CONST. art. V.
54. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl.1.
55. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 3.
56. The euphemisms were, apparently, an attempt to avoid losing support for
the constitution in the anti-slavery North. FINKELMAN, supra note 45, at 3.
However, discerning readers of the document figured it out.
57. See id. at 3-7 (discussing other constitutional protections of slavery).

2015]

OF WORD GRENADES

James Madison's own words support the proslavery
interpretation of the Constitution. During the Constitutional
Convention, Madison recognized that the most significant
difference to be negotiated between the states was over the status
of slavery:
But [Madison] contended that the States were divided into
different interests not by their difference of size, but by other
circumstances; the most material of which resulted partly
from climate, but principally from the effects of their having or
not having slaves. These two causes concurred in forming the
great division of interests in the U. States. It did not lie
between the large & small States: It lay between the Northern
& Southern, and if any defensive power were necessary, it
ought to be mutually given to these two interests. He was so
strongly impressed with this important truth that he had been
casting about in his mind for some expedient that would
answer the purpose.'
If James Madison recognized that the status of slavery was the
most important division of interests in the new nation, one would
expect that sense of importance to have made it into constitutional
law textbooks.
Later, Madison defended the inclusion of property in slaves
as a basis for apportionment in Federalist No. 54:
The true state of the case is, that [slaves] partake of both
these qualities; being considered by our laws, in some
respects, as persons, and in other respects, as property ....
The Federal Constitution therefore, decides with great
propriety on the case of our slaves, when it views them in the
mixed character of persons and of property. This is in fact
their true character. It is the character bestowed on them by
the laws under which they live; and it will not be denied that
these are the proper criterion ....

Let the compromising

expedient of the Constitution be mutually adopted, which
regards them as inhabitants, but as debased by servitude
below the equal level of free inhabitants, which regards the
slave as divested of two fifth of the man.
During debates on ratification of the Constitution in Virginia,
Madison defended two of the Constitution's protections for slavery,
the slave-import limitation and the fugitive slave clause:
I should conceive this clause [the slave import limitation] to be

58. NOTES OF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 REPORTED BY

JAMES

MADISON 224-25

DEBATES]; see

1

(Adrienne

Koch, ed.

1966)

[hereinafter

NOTES

THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 at

Farrand ed., rev. ed. 1966); see also
same quotation).

FINKELMAN, supra

OF

486 (Max

note 45, at 14 (discussing

59. THE FEDERALIST No. 54 JAMES MADISON, reprinted in THE AMERICAN
CONSTITUTION 240-41 (J.R. Pole ed., 1987) (emphasis in original).
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impolitic, if it were one of those things which could be
excluded without encountering greater evils. The Southern
States would not have entered into the Union of America
without the temporary permission of that trade; and if they
were excluded from the Union, the consequences might be
dreadful to them and to us. We are not in a worse situation
than before ....
From the mode of representation and
taxation, Congress cannot lay such a tax on slaves as will
amount to manumission. Another clause secures us that
property which we now possess. At present, if any slave
elopes to any of those states where slaves are free, he becomes
emancipated by their laws; for the laws of the states are
uncharitable to one another in this respect. But in this
Constitution, 'no person held to service or labor in one state,
under the laws thereof, escaping into another, shall, in
consequence of any law or regulation therein, be discharged
from such service or labor; but shall be delivered up on claim
of the party to whom such service or labor shall be due.' This
clause was expressly inserted, to enable owners of slaves to
reclaim them.
This is a better security than any that now exists. No power is
given to the general government to interpose with respect to
the property in slaves now held by the states .... Great as the
evil is, a dismemberment of the Union would be worse. If
those states should disunite from the other states for not
indulging them in the temporary continuance of this traffic,
they might solicit and obtain aid from foreign powers.6'
Both the text of the Constitution and Madison's defense of its
protections for slavery are strong evidence supporting the
proslavery interpretation of the Constitution.
This evidence,
taken together with the conclusion of a majority of historians that
the Constitution was proslavery, fairly establishes its character as
proslavery.
These materials also establish the centrality of
slavery and slavery-protection at the Constitutional Convention.
Given all of this, why is this evidence neglected in constitutional
law casebooks, and why do constitutional law professors not teach
routinely that the constitution was proslavery? 1

60. James Madison, Speech at the Virginia Ratifying Convention (June 17,
1788), reprinted in 3

THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE

ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 453, 453-54 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed.
1836).
61. Just for the record, in my constitutional law classes I teach exactly this
material. When we begin to cover Race and the Constitution, I assign the students
my article on Race and Constitutional Law casebooks, so they can examine and
discuss that evidence. Derrick Bell engaged with the proslavery constitution and
its ramifications at the outset of his constitutional law course. When he taught his
course as a visitor at Stanford, he was subject to student complaints and discontent
which resulted in a series of lectures apparently designed to serve as corrective to
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IV. Imperial Scholarship and Constitutional Law
Delgado's critique of imperial scholars is grounded in
epistemological limitations that they bring to their writing. As
Richard wrote, the "exclusion of minority scholars' writings about
key issues of race law [has] caused the literature dealing with
race, racism, and American law to be blunted, skewed, and riddled
with omissions.6 2 While one cannot overgeneralize with respect to
race, since some White scholars recognize and engage
meaningfully with the proslavery Constitution, 3 it is striking that
the work of imperial scholars in constitutional law essentially
ignores evidence of the proslavery Constitution. 4 While this may
principally be true with respect to constitutional law casebooks, it
appears that part of the unstated ideology of imperial scholars is
to ignore the Constitution's endorsement of slavery and the
implications of that endorsement.1
They seem disinclined to
present the Constitution as a racist document, which it surely
was.
Why, if the evidence supports the conclusion that the
Constitution supported slavery and was profoundly racist, do we
not discuss or teach the Constitution in this way?
It seems to me that ignoring the evidence of the proslavery
Constitution marginalizes the importance of race and racism
before and at the founding of the nation. The fact of slavery is
impossible to ignore entirely. But by minimizing the role of
slavery in the Constitution's drafting,"7 one can go a long way
towards making slavery and White American racism into a side
issue, rather than an issue of central importance. 8 And making
racism of peripheral, rather than central, concern in the study of
Bell's teaching. See Richard Delgado, An Unasked Question (Oct. 23, 2011), http:/
professorderrickbell.com/tributes/richard-delgado!.
The resistance of White
students and colleagues can be a significant obstacle faced by anyone who teaches
this material. It seems entirely unacceptable, however, to pander to ignorance and
resistance rather than to help students face unmistakable historical evidence and
to consider its contemporary ramifications.
62. Imperial Scholar Revisited, supra note 13, at 1349.

63. See

FINKELMAN, supra note

45;

MARK GRABER, DRED SCOTT AND THE

(2006).
64. See, e.g., Imperial Scholar, supra note 12, at 562 n.3 (listing prominent legal
scholars including those whose constitutional scholarship ignores the document's
racist deficiencies).
65. See id.
66. E.g., Sidney Willhelm, The Supreme Court: A Citadel for White Supremacy,
79 MICH.L. REV. 847,852 (1981) ("[Tjhe Constitution itself is a racist document.").
67. See, e.g., FINKELMAN, supra note 45, at ix ("[Silavery was a central issue of
the American Founding.").
68. See LOEWEN, supra note 35, at 261-95 (1995) (discussing how ideology
informs the creation of particular accounts of history).
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constitutional law leads to serious underestimation of how racist
the nation was and perhaps continues to be."
This
underestimation of White racism as a founding principle of
nationhood then contributes to exaggeration of the Constitution's
virtues and to blindness regarding the continuing legacies of
foundational White racism."
Historians recognize that the social system represented by
slavery became a deeply embedded structural component of
American culture.71 As stated by historian George William Van
Cleve:
American slavery was not just a brutal, oppressive labor
system. As historians have shown, it was a multidimensional
institution of social control. In the mainland colonies, it
served as a means of enforcing racial separation and
subordination, of limiting the cost of poor relief for the
unemployed and disabled, and of controlling crime. These
social-control functions of slavery embedded it deeply in
American culture. 72
Similarly, historian David Waldstreicher writes, "Slavery was also
a form of government over people .... Like the Constitution,
slavery was inherently a matter of7 3fundamental law. It defined
the places of people in their society.
When the Constitution overtly embraced slavery protection,
the social system of White supremacy and Black subordination
was reified in the country's founding document.74 Although the
Reconstruction Amendments formally ended slavery and some
forms of race discrimination, the basic structures of White
domination have far outlived Reconstruction.
In a nation
founded on White racism, can it really be a surprise that our
system of criminal law and imprisonment constitutes a new Jim
Crow, shackling disproportionate numbers of Black and Latino
men and women and effectively removing them from full
participation in society?76 Law, in mutating forms, becomes a
69. See Willhelm, supra note 66, at 847 (discussing the Supreme Court's history
ofracist jurisprudence over a series offour book reviews).
70. See FINKELMAN, supra note 45, at x (discussing the need to confront the

legacy of slavery).
71. VAN CLEVE, supra note 45, at 24.
72. Id.

73. David Waldstreicher, The Mansfieldian Moment: Slavery, the Constitution,
and American Political Traditions, 43 RUTGERS L.J. 471, 477 (2013).
74. See, e.g., FINKELMAN, supra note 45, at 1-33 (discussing the influence of
slavery on the Constitutional Convention).
75. See, e.g., MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW (2011) (discussing the
racist dynamics of contemporary incarceration).
76. See id.
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vehicle for continuing race subordination of Blacks and Latinos by
Whites.77 These propositions would be easier to understand and
accept if we learned, early on, that the Constitution reinforced and
protected just such a system of racial subordination by law."8
V. Conclusion
Thirty years ago, Richard Delgado recognized the omissions
and distortions of knowledge produced by imperial scholars who
marginalize the writing and insights of scholars of color.
He
wrote with great courage, identifying the many problems posed by
civil rights scholarship written by White imperial scholars. Thirty
years later, we still witness much the same phenomenon. His
thoughts on how to respond to imperial scholarship still stand.
What should be done? As a beginning, minority students and
teachers should raise insistently and often the unsatisfactory
quality of the scholarship being produced by the inner circle-its
biases, omissions, and errors. Its presuppositions and world-views
should be made explicit and challenged.
That feedback will
increase the likelihood that when a well-wishing White scholar
writes about minority problems, he or she will give minority
viewpoints and literature the full consideration due.
That
consideration may help the author avoid the types of substantive
error catalogued earlier." How many more years, how many more
lifetimes will it take before the knowledge we develop helps inform
serious consideration of how the Constitution, its politics and its
law continue to shape the racism that still pervades our society?

77.
78.
79.
80.

See id.
See Willhelm, supra note 66, at 852.
See Imperial Scholar, supra note 12.
Id. at 577.

